Case of the Day: Patrick's Rest. v. Singh, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2535 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2019)

Summary:

Defendant appealed the magistrate judge's ruling that allowed service by email to India after the plaintiff has been unable to serve under the Hague Convention. Defendant argued, inter alia, that because India's objection to service by mail includes service by email. 

The district court rejected the argument. While the courts are split on this issue, the court found a "strong majority of courts" have held that email is not transmission through "postal channels" as provided for in the Hague Convention.

Takeaway:

We are back for the new year! Here is a nice, straightforward service issue to kick off the new season. This appears to be a straightforward and correct decision as emails are plainly not sent through postal channels as stated in the Hague Convention.

Case of the Day: Active Way Int'l Ltd. v. Smith Elec. Vehicles Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29764 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2018)

Summary:

Judgment debtor Smith Electric Vehicles Corp. contested the motion for preliminary injunction to transfer certain stock and credit bid to the judgment creditor, based on a Missouri judgment which was originally a Hong Kong judgment.

The court granted the motion, rejecting the judgment debtor's argument that the Hong Kong judgment was invalidly obtained, as "Smith presents no case suggesting the Court may look behind the Missouri judgment to the underlying Hong Kong judgment."

Takeaway:

This is the correct statement of law, but the true significance of this decision is the implication upon the judgment enforcement strategy. Remember the cardinal lesson: possession is more than half of the battle. Facing a recalcitrant debtor, the best way is to start seizing the assets to smoke out the debtor. In this sense, a foreign judgment often can be more advantageous, because litigating in the United States takes more time and cost. Once converted into a U.S. judgment through recognition, the challenge to the underlying foreign judgment becomes available only at the forum in which the recognition was given--which means executing against properties located in a different jurisdiction becomes quite easy, putting you halfway toward victory.

Case of the Day: Moseley v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11609 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2018)

Summary:

Plaintiff is the estate of a decedent who died in an accident involving the motorcycle manufactured by defendant Suzuki, distributed through American Suzuki Motor Corporation (which is now defunct.) The motorcycle was originally purchased in Utah, then was resold to an owner in Idaho. The owner lent the decedent to ride the motorcycle, whose brakes allegedly failed and killed the rider. Defendant moved to dismiss.

The court granted the motion, finding there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which is a Japanese corporation. That the defendant operated a subsidiary in Idaho was not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. The court also found it notable that the particular motorcycle in this case was purchased in Utah rather than Idaho.

Takeaway:

In this blog's unofficial 50-state survey of the long-arm personal jurisdiction, chalk Idaho into the "not so long" column. There are interesting factual points that may change the court's decision later--for example, what if the motorcycle was purchased in Idaho rather than Utah? But as of now, Idaho should be considered to be a state that follows Nicastro and disavowed the stream of commerce theory.

Case of the Day: C.C. v. Suzuki Mfg. of Am. Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170293 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2017)

Summary:

Plaintiff sued the defendant, a Japanese corporation, for a personal injury that occurred while he was riding the ATV manufactured by the defendant. The defendant moved to dismiss based lack of personal jurisdiction.

After discussing the history of the "stream of commerce" theory, the court found jurisdiction "because [the defendant] created the distribution network that brought the subject ATV to Missouri[,]" such that "the subject ATV did not end up Missouri on an 'attenuated, random, or fortuitous' basis" (citing Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1994)).

Takeaway:

It lives! The "stream of commerce" theory lives on in the Eighth Circuit! Somehow, the courts in the Midwest are sticking to the old formulation of the "stream of commerce" theory despite the repeated pull back from the U.S. Supreme Court. (Last September, an Illinois appellate court reached the same conclusion.)

Case of the Day: Lee v. Sessions, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57123 (D. Minn. Mar. 9, 2017)

Summary:

Petitioner, a Laotian citizen, filed for a writ of habeas corpus while being in custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. While the petition was pending, the petitioner was released from custody subject to supervision. Petitioner was facing deportation and removal, but could not be removed to Laos because the Laotian government declined to issue a passport for him, based in Laotian law.

The court denied the petition as moot, as the petitioner was already released and there was no significant danger of repeated injury.

Takeaway:

No major surprise in the actual ruling in this case, but the factual background was what drew my attention. Law across borders is always a little bit of a mess involving ill-fitting parts, but there is no place like immigration law that truly shows the human stakes of such an ill fit. Why would the petitioner have to be kept out of Laos? Why would the petitioner be in custody in the United States? But this is the result in which he landed.

Case of the Day: Yang v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42501 (D. Minn. Mar. 23, 2017)

Summary:

Plaintiff's grandmother had a life insurance policy with the defendant insurer. Defendant refused to pay out the policy upon the grandmother's passing, claiming that the policy holder was 69 years old when she took out the policy. The insurance policy has a maximum issue age limit of 60 years old.

The policy holder had "two birthdays"--one indicated by birth records from Laos, and another assigned by the U.S. immigration authorities. The policy holder was 59 years old according to the former, and 69 years old according to the latter. Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff . The court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the age of the insured. But the court also found that, even if the insured was indeed 69 years old, the incontestability provision in the insurance policy prohibited the insurance company from challenging the validity of the policy once the policy had been in effect for two years. Because the policy had been in effect for two years, the defendant was barred from challenging it.

Takeaway:

It is a common problem for Asian Americans that their birthday is botched in the process of immigration. (For another rendition of this issue, see Teng v. District Director, USCIS, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8161 (9th Cir. May 4, 2016)). It is exceedingly difficult to establish the "true" birthday; the plaintiff here could not do so either. Only the incontestability provision in the life insurance policy saved them from losing the case.

Case of the Day: United States v. McConnell, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13283 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2017)

Summary:

Petitioner, a Canadian citizen living in the Philippines, was indicted in 2013 for a scheme to sell illegal prescription drugs in the United States. In 2016, the Canadian government revoked the petitioner's passport, and the Philippines immigration authorities detained him for deportation proceeding. While being in Filipino detention, the petitioner handed over a hard drive to an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. After the petitioner was deported from the Philippines, the DEA agent escorted him on a flight to the United States, and arrested the petitioner upon his entry into the U.S.

The petitioner moved to suppress evidence from the hard drive, and statements he made before he entered the United States, claiming he was not under arrest until he entered the United States. As to the hard drive, the court denied the motion because the petitioner voluntarily handed over the evidence. The court similarly found that the petitioner waived his Miranda rights as to his statements, rejecting the argument that the petitioner's only way to exit the Philippines immigration detention was to speak with the DEA agent.

Takeaway:

Here is a case with an interesting fact pattern that confirms the most basic truth about criminal defense: don't talk to cops. If you are a criminal suspect--even if you actually committed a crime!--nothing good comes from voluntarily offering up statements and evidence. Not even if you are stuck in an immigration jail in the Philippines.

Case of the Day: Compart's Boar Store v. United States, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12847 (8th Cir. July 13, 2016)

Summary:

Plaintiff swine breeding company was scheduled to export hundreds of pigs to China, but the Chinese buyer refused when the pigs were tested positive for disease. The company sued the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, which tested the pigs, under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because the testing fell under the discretionary action exemption under the FTCA. Because NVSL's actions were discretionary, the U.S. government did not waive its sovereign immunity.

Takeaway:

Curious if the plaintiff had any cause of action against the Chinese party that it did not bring because of the inconvenience of suing against a Chinese party.

Case of the Day: Ribeiro v. Baby Trend, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71190 (D. Neb. June 1, 2016)

Summary:

The case concerns an allegedly defective baby car seat, whose belt caused asphyxiation and brain damage. There are a number of defendants, who are largely divisible into two groups:  a Swedish manufacturer and its affiliates ("Gnotec") and a Chinese manufacturer and its affiliates ("Lerado"). Both groups moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.

After jurisdictional discovery, the court dismissed against Gnotec, but sustained the case against Lerado. The court found jurisdiction over Lerado on multiple grounds. First, Lerado failed to raise the personal jurisdiction defense in the earlier stage of the case, thereby waiving the defense. The court found that all Lerado entities were alter egos of one another, which means the waiver is binding on every entity. Second, the court found that Lerado has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, as it directed the sale of its car seats to Nebraska. In contrast, because Gnotec is a parts manufacturer that dealt with Lerado rather than directly with the forum, the court found it had no jurisdiction over Gnotec.

Takeaway:

This is a surprising case. In most circumstances, the case against Lerado would be dismissed. The waiver part may be chalked up to poor lawyering, but finding alter ego over all the Chinese defendants--without much discussion about the facts that led to that conclusion--is highly unusual. Even more unusual is finding jurisdiction on the basis of "directing sales"--a conclusion that flies in the face of Asahi Metal, which the court brushes off by stating that Asahi Metal has no precedential value because it only had a plurality opinion rather than a majority opinion.